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INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth Amendment, “the linchpin of the current
constitutional system,”1 is vital to the integrity of the Constitution.
Particularly in the 1860s and 1870s, and again in the 20th century, the
Amendment has had the greatest influence on the way American citizens
live their lives, and it is cited more often in modern litigation than any
other amendment.2 The Fourteenth Amendment overturned Chief Justice
Roger Tawney’s notorious 1857 decision, Scott v. Sanford.3 In 1886, the
Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to rule that
corporations were persons in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
1. Garrett Epps, The Struggle Over the Meaning of the 14th Amendment
Continues, ATLANTIC (July 10, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive
/2018/07/the-struggle-over-the-meaning-of-the-14th-amendment-continues/564722/
[https://perma.cc/4KCA-KNY3].
2. Id. On the importance of the Fourteenth Amendment, see generally
JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER THE LAW (Collier Books 1965) (1951);
DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 1776–1995 155–56, 164–77, 183–86 (Univ. Press of Kan. 1996);
GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE
INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 2 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2013);
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (Duke Univ. Press 1986); GARRETT EPPS,
DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT FOR
EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA (Henry Holt & Co. 2006); MICHAEL
A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND THE
SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA (LSU Press 2003).
3. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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Railroad.4 In 1954, the courts used the Fourteenth Amendment in Brown
v. The Board of Education of Topeka to overturn the 1896 decision Plessy
v. Ferguson, which legalized segregation.5 In 1962, the Fourteenth
Amendment was the basis of the Baker v. Carr Supreme Court ruling that
legislative bodies must consist of one man, one vote.6 The Court used the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process and equal protection
in 1963 to desegregate Clemson University.7 In 1966, the courts used the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to overturn the
male-only admission policy of the Virginia Military Institute.8 In 1971, the
Court held that a law discriminating against women violated the
Fourteenth Amendment and overturned the 1873 Bradwell v. Illinois
decision, which upheld Illinois’s refusal to allow women to become
lawyers.9 In 1973, the landmark Roe v. Wade case was based on the
Fourteenth Amendment.10 Finally, in 2000, the Supreme Court decided the
presidential election in Bush v. Gore on the basis of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.11
How, and why, did the Fourteenth Amendment become this
extraordinarily wide-ranging in its application and its influence in the
United States, when the drafters created the Fourteenth Amendment to
protect the rights of the newly freed enslaved people in the South and to
provide them citizenship rights? This Article investigates the beginning of
the story in the second half of the 19th century, when the Fourteenth
Amendment revolutionized the lives and possibilities of AfricanAmericans. It goes on to discuss how the Supreme Court undid most of
those gains toward equality and equal rights for black citizens. Revolutions
do go backward, and this story stands as a warning for modern times and
court interpretations.
This year, 2018, is the sesquicentennial of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress created, and the states ratified, the Fourteenth Amendment
during Reconstruction to protect a group of formerly enslaved people.
Although courts interpret laws through cases about particular individuals
and not groups of people, the consequences of those individual rulings
4. Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
5. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
7. See Gantt v. Clemson Agr. College of S.C., 320 F.2d 611 (4th Cir. 1963).
In addition, the author currently teaches at Clemson University.
8. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
9. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
10. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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have major reprecussions for groups of people, especially AfricanAmericans.
I. THE CIVIL WAR, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE “NEW BIRTH OF
FREEDOM”
The Civil War bicentennial has finished and Reconstruction’s
bicentennial has begun. Historians typically argue that Reconstruction
ended with the withdrawal of the few federal troops remaining in the
former Confederate states in 1877, but that is not how people viewed the
situation or lived their lives at the time. The Civil War and Reconstruction
cannot be separated; Reconstruction is part and parcel of the long Civil
War.
During Reconstruction, former Confederate generals led paramilitary
groups with many former Confederate soldiers.12 In Louisiana and South
Carolina, men too young to fight in the Civil War rode with the terrorists
and paramilitary groups in 1876 and 1878 and applied for their states’
Confederate War pensions.13 These soldiers who had not fought in the
Civil War believed Reconstruction was part of the Civil War.14
Reconstruction ended when the United States Supreme Court reversed
gains of freedom for African-Americans during Reconstruction; the
Fourteenth Amendment is the centerpiece for understanding this
complicated history. In 1896, the Supreme Court sanctioned the “separate
but equal” doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson; in 1898, the Court allowed
voting disenfranchisement in Williams v. Mississippi.15 After the Supreme
Court gave the green light, the former Confederacy rushed to construct
state governments based on white supremacy.16
12. See, e.g., ORVILLE VERNON BURTON, THE AGE OF LINCOLN 295 (Hill &
Wang 2007); ORVILLE VERNON BURTON, UNGRATEFUL SERVANTS? EDGEFIELD’S
BLACK RECONSTRUCTION: PART I OF THE TOTAL HISTORY OF EDGEFIELD COUNTY
(1976); Orville Vernon Burton et al., Defining Reconstruction, in A COMPANION
TO THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 299–322 (Lacy Ford ed., 2005).
13. Supra note 12.
14. Supra note 12.
15. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Williams v. Mississippi, 170
U.S. 213 (1898). Before Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898), only
Mississippi and South Carolina had created new state constitutions disfranchising
and implementing de jure segregation.
16. Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND.
L. REV. 523, 536 n.46 (1973). The classic study of southern state disfranchisement
is J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE
RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880–1910
(Yale Univ. Press 1974). See also MICHAEL PERMAN, STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY:
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A. Lincoln’s Beliefs Before the War
At a cost of more than 600,000–750,000 dead, and just as many
maimed or wounded, the Civil War held the Union together and ended
slavery.17 More than one person died for every six freed in the Civil War.18
The uprooting of slavery unleashed a broad debate about what freedom
signified and what it meant to be an American citizen.
Abraham Lincoln, for example, professed that freedom signified
aiming for equality. In Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, given midway
through the war, he promised “a new birth of freedom” for a nation
“conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are
created equal.”19 In Lincoln’s two most famous speeches, he spoke of his
remaining tasks. In the Gettysburg Address, he spoke of the need to
conclude “the unfinished work which they who fought here so nobly
advanced.”20 In his Second Inaugural Address, he expressed similar
DISFRANCHISEMENT IN THE SOUTH, 1888–1908 (Univ. of N.C. Press 2001);
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (Basic Books 2000); R. Volney Riser,
DEFYING DISFRANCHISEMENT: BLACK VOTING RIGHTS ACTIVISM IN THE JIM
CROW SOUTH, 1890–1908 (LSU Press 2010). Before the Supreme Court’s ruling,
only Mississippi and South Carolina had legally disenfranchised AfricanAmerican voters. Louisiana, North Carolina, Alabama, Virginia, and Georgia
joined Mississippi and South Carolina in adopting new disfranchising
constitutions; other states acted by statute.
17. The historical estimate was 600,000. Historical demographers figure
newer estimates between “650,000 to 850,000 . . . with a preferred estimate of
750,000.” J. David Hacker, A Census-Based Count of the Civil War Dead, 57 CIV.
WAR HIST. 307, 348 (2011). See also J. David Hacker, Recounting the Dead, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2011), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/re
counting-the-dead/ [https://perma.cc/5A94-JWPV] (recounting the dead); STEVEN
V. ASH, THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN THE CIVIL WAR SOUTH 74–75 (Praeger 2010).
On the cost of the war, see Phillip Shaw Paludan, What Did the Winners Win? The
Social and Economic History of the North during the Civil War, in WRITING THE
CIVIL WAR: THE QUEST TO UNDERSTAND 181–82, 197 (James M. McPherson &
William J. Cooper, Jr. eds., 1998); Claudia Golden & Frank Lewis, The Economic
Cost of the American Civil War: Estimates and Implications, 35 J. OF ECON. HIST.
299–326 (1975); SUSAN PREVIANT LEE & PETER PASSELL, A NEW ECONOMIC VIEW
OF AMERICAN HISTORY 360–63 (W. W. Norton & Co. 1994).
18. See supra note 17.
19. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863); see ORVILLE
VERNON BURTON, THE ESSENTIAL LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND CORRESPONDENCE
253–54 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2009).
20. See supra note 19.
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sentiments: “With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness
in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the
work we are in.”21 The Fourteenth Amendment represents the beginning
to tackling Lincoln’s “unfinished work.”
Lincoln expressed his devotion to liberty and to the Declaration of
Independence as early as the 1850s. On October 16, 1854, in Peoria,
Lincoln proclaimed: “Let us readopt the Declaration of Independence, and
with it the practices and policy which harmonize with it. . . . If we do this,
we shall not only have saved the Union, but we shall have so saved it as to
make and to keep it forever worthy of the saving.”22
In 1857, the African-American abolitionist Frederick Douglass stated
what would become Lincoln’s belief:
The constitution, as well as the Declaration of Independence, and
the sentiments of the founders of the Republic give us a platform
broad enough, and strong enough, to support the most
comprehensive plans for the freedom and elevation of all the
people of this country without regard to color, class, or clime.23
Further, on July 10, 1858, in an extemporaneous speech in Chicago
responding to a call for white supremacy, Lincoln declared:
I should like to know if taking this old Declaration of Independence
which declares that all men are equal upon principle, and making
exceptions to it, where will it stop . . . . I have only to say, let us
discard all this quibbling about this man and the other man—this
race and that race and the other race being inferior, and therefore
they must be placed in an inferior position . . . . Let us discard all
these things, and unite as one people throughout this land, until we
shall once more stand up declaring that all men are created equal.24
Douglass and Lincoln agreed—if freedom were to have a new birth,
the Constitution would have to be brought into line, and with the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment during Reconstruction, it was.
The six years following the war produced a series of amendments and laws
21. Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865); see
BURTON, supra note 19.
22. Abraham Lincoln, Peoria Speech (Oct. 16, 1854); see BURTON, supra
note 19.
23. Frederick Douglass, West India Emancipation Speech in Canandaigua,
N.Y. (Aug. 3, 1857).
24. Abraham Lincoln, Chicago Speech (July 10, 1858); see BURTON, supra
note 19.
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to bring “a new birth of freedom.”25 Lincoln believed that the
Emancipation Proclamation was “the central act of [his] administration
and the great event of the 19th century,” and he stated that if he were to be
remembered for anything it would be the Emancipation Proclamation.26 It
was Lincoln’s understanding of liberty, however, that became the greatest
legacy of the age.27
“Equality” was memorialized in the Declaration of Independence, the
United States’s mission statement, but not the Constitution, the country’s
rule book. Lincoln revolutionized personal freedom in the United States
by assuring that the law protected it. Lincoln essentially inserted the
Declaration of Independence into the Constitution.
B. Heading into Reconstruction
The Reconstruction era of American government redefined the role of
government as a protector of liberty. In 1864, Abraham Lincoln told a
group in Baltimore, “The world has never had a good definition of the
word liberty, and the American people just now are much in want of
one.”28 Political philosophy involves an analysis of “positive” and
“negative” liberty.29 Several years before political philosopher Isaiah
Berlin brought those concepts of positive and negative liberty to the
25. See Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863); see BURTON,
supra note 19.
26. Emancipation Proclamation, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.
britannica.com/event/Emancipation-Proclamation#accordion-article-history [https://
perma.cc/9ZZ7-SFW6] (last visited Sept. 23, 2018). See also BURTON, supra note 19.
27. Francis B. Carpenter, Anecdotes and Reminiscences, in HENRY J.
RAYMOND, THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN: TOGETHER
WITH HIS STATE PAPERS, INCLUDING HIS SPEECHES, ADDRESSES, MESSAGES,
LETTERS, AND PROCLAMATIONS, AND THE CLOSING SCENES CONNECTED WITH HIS
LIFE AND DEATH; TO WHICH ARE ADDED ANECDOTES AND PERSONAL
REMINISCENCES OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN BY FRANK B. CARPENTER 764 (Derby &
Miller 1865). That Lincoln’s greatest legacy was introducing and assuring
personal liberty is the thesis of BURTON, THE AGE OF LINCOLN, supra note 12.
28. Abraham Lincoln, Address at Sanitary Fair, Balt., Md. (Apr. 18, 1864);
see BURTON, THE AGE OF LINCOLN, supra note 12, at 165–66.
29. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY
(1959); BURTON, THE AGE OF LINCOLN, supra note 12. On positive and negative
liberty and Lincoln, see James M. McPherson, Lincoln and Liberty, in ABRAHAM
LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1990); Don E.
Ferhenbacher, The Paradoxes of Freedom, in LINCOLN IN TEXT AND CONTEST
(1987); PHILIP SHAW PALUDAN, THE PRESIDENCY OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 230–
31 (1994).
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forefront in 1958, Lincoln knew all about negative and positive liberty. He
did not expound on the topic while in front of this Baltimore crowd—
instead, he told a simple story:
The shepherd drives the wolf from the sheep’s throat, for which
the sheep thanks the shepherd as a liberator, while the wolf
denounces him for the same act as the destroyer of liberty,
especially as the sheep was a black one. Plainly the sheep and the
wolf are not agreed upon a definition of the word liberty.30
Lincoln was thankful that “the wolf’s dictionary ha[d] been
repudiated.”31 Prior to the Civil War, “we the people” wanted freedom from
government. The Bill of Rights protected the people from governmental
powers. The First Amendment begins: “Congress shall make no law
respecting . . . .”32 The First Amendment, therefore, creates an understanding
that the government, by non-action, protects freedom.33 In reality, however,
that “repudiation” is a never-ending story still being told through the
Fourteenth Amendment.
II. THE THREE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS
The three Reconstruction Amendments revolutionized freedom in the
United States by assuring that freedom was protected by law. Each of the
three Reconstruction Amendments—the Thirteenth, which outlawed
slavery; the Fourteenth, which granted citizenship to people born in the
United States and ensured due process; and the Fifteenth, which granted
the right to vote to all male citizens—all specify that “Congress shall have
power to enforce . . . .”34 These amendments fundamentally altered the
Constitution.
During Reconstruction, the core American belief in the need to limit
governmental power was transforming. The cavalcade of amendments and
laws from 1865 to 1871 produced a comprehensive structure of freedom,
including provisions for racial equality in public and private matters,
guarantees of fairness in legal and judicial proceedings, federal protection
against public or private invasion of the new guarantees, and—central to
30. Lincoln, supra note 28; see BURTON, THE AGE OF LINCOLN, supra note
12, at 165–66.
31. Lincoln, supra note 28; see BURTON, THE AGE OF LINCOLN, supra note
12, at 165–66.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
33. See McPherson, supra note 29; Ferhenbacher, supra note 29; PALUDAN,
supra note 29, at 230–31; BURTON, THE AGE OF LINCOLN, supra note 12.
34. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, § 1, and XV (emphasis added).
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all—the right to vote.35 These amendments and laws notably lacked, after
some early efforts, economic assistance and land reform.36
The various passed measures helped to put four million freed people
on an uncertain path toward full citizenship. Yet, slavery’s death did not
automatically confer any positive rights upon African-Americans.
Slavery’s end liberated African-Americans only from a master’s
ownership, eliminating, at the same time, the latter’s motive for selfinterested benevolence, which enslaved people manipulated and tried to
use to their benefit.
A. The Thirteenth Amendment
In January 1865, with the war’s end in sight, Congress introduced the
Thirteenth Amendment.37 Section 1 states, “Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.”38
The Amendment also included a potent enforcement section stating
that “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.”39 Amending the Constitution to give Congress more power to
enforce laws was based in the Constitution’s “necessary and proper”
clause,40 which states that Congress shall have power “to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution . . . all
other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States.”41 Nevertheless, the 11 words of the enforcement section in the
Thirteenth Amendment changed the role of the federal government in
securing citizens’ rights.
Abraham Lincoln was adamant that a constitutional amendment was
necessary to ban slavery. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision
35. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIV and XV.
36. African-American males in the former Confederacy were given the
franchise with the Military Reconstruction Acts in 1867 so that they could vote
for the new Reconstruction state constitutions after the former Confederate
leaders had implemented state constitutions that did not recognize AfricanAmerican rights. Also notably lacking, or abandoned, were women’s rights.
37. 13th Amenment to the U.S. Constitution, LIBR. OF CONGRESS (July 12,
2018), https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/13thamendment.html [https://
perma.cc/7S9N-CH58].
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
39. Id.
40. Id. art. I, § 8.
41. Id.
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of 1857, which declared African-Americans had “no rights which the
white man was bound to respect,” was still the law of the land.42 Historians
still debate whether Chief Justice Taney, who wrote the Supreme Court’s
Dred Scott opinion, had already drawn up a memorandum to declare that
the Emancipation Proclamation was only a wartime measure and would
not apply after the war.43 Whether or not the memorandum existed, it is
clear what Tawney thought and what he would have most likely done.
Moreover, the Emancipation Proclamation did not address the entire
nation. It did not cover those areas that loyal slaveholders held in the
Union border states. As a British newspaper, The Spectator, wrote, “The
principle asserted is not that a human being cannot justly own another, but
that he cannot own him unless he is loyal to the United States.”44 Thus, it
took military victory and the Thirteenth Amendment to abolish slavery
officially nationwide.
In April of 1864, the Senate approved the Thirteenth Amendment and
sent it to the House of Representatives,45 where Republicans and
Democrats were fundamentally split. Democrats knew slavery’s day was
done but thought emancipation should do no more than end bondage,
leaving African-Americans as second-class people in a white man’s

42. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
43. There is a debate among historians; some believe that Chief Justice Taney
had already drawn up a memorandum to declare that the Emancipation
Proclamation was only a wartime measure and would not apply after the war. Others
believe he did not draft the memorandum. We know Taney thought most of what
Lincoln did was unconstitutional, and he did draft memos or opinions on some
issues before they became cases, so whether he actually did for the Emancipation
Proclamation seems a minor matter. See HAROLD M. HUMAN & WILLIAM M.
WIECKE, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 18351875 252–55, 268, 274, 305, 397 (Harper & Row 1982); DON E. FEHRENBACHER,
THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
(Oxford Univ. Press 1978); JAMES SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY:
SLAVERY, SECESSION, AND THE PRESIDENT’S WAR POWERS 222–23, 245 (2006);
Timothy Huebner, “The Unjust Judge”: Roger B. Taney, the Slave Power, and the
Meaning of Emancipation, 40 J. OF SUP. CT. HIST. 249, 253–55 (2015); PAUL
FINKELMAN, SUPREME INJUSTICE: SLAVERY IN THE NATION’S HIGHEST COURT
(Harvard Univ. Press 2018).
44. The President’s Last Proclamation, SPECTATOR (London), Oct. 11, 1862,
at 115.
45. Rick Beard, The Birth of the 13th Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2014,
10:35 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/08/the-birth-of-the13th-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/U62A-CKZB].
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country.46 The Democrats insisted that their opposition to the Thirteenth
Amendment was simply a fear that its meaning included the equality they
despised.47 The Democratic party campaigned as the white man’s party
and as the party of white supremacy.48
Republicans ranged over a spectrum, from those who favored limited
rights to those who believed in full equality—and were called “radical”
for that reason. Supporters of the Amendment assured its opponents that
the Amendment’s meaning did not go beyond emancipation. In the
constitutionally required two-thirds vote, on January 31, 1865, every
Republican voted in favor of the Amendment.49
The Democratic Party was solidly against the Amendment, except for
a handful of Democrats whose “aye” votes President Lincoln secured
through methods dramatized in the Steven Spielberg film, Lincoln.50 The
Amendment passed 119–56—three votes the other way would have meant
the Amendment’s defeat. In jubilation over the passage, Representative
George Julian of Indiana wrote in his diary: “Members joined in the
shouting and kept it up for some minutes. Some embraced one another,
others wept like children. I have felt, ever since the vote, as if I were in a
new country.”51 Indeed, it was a new country.

46. See generally Abigail Perkiss, Abraham Lincoln as constitutional radical:
the 13th amendment, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (July 12, 2013), https://constitutioncenter
.org/blog/abraham-lincoln-as-constitutional-radical-the-13th-amendment [https://per
ma.cc/Q3JB-R33D].
47. See generally id.
48. See generally id.
49. Passage, MR. LINCOLN & FREEDOM, http://www.mrlincolnandfreedom.org
/civil-war/13th-amendment/passage/ [https://perma.cc/F9VM-7HYP] (last visited
Sept. 23, 2018) (quoting journalist Noah Brooks).
50. See LINCOLN (DreamWorks Pictures 2012).
51. DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995 162 (Univ. Press of Kan. 1996). See also JAMES M.
MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA (Oxford Univ.
Press 1988); MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE
ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2001); LEONARD L. RICHARDS, WHO FREED THE SLAVE? THE FIGHT OVER
THE 13TH AMENDMENT (Univ. of Chi. Press 2015); ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE
PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT (Columbia Univ. Press 2010); CHRISTIAN G. SAMITO,
LINCOLN AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT (S. Ill. Univ. Press 2015).
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B. The South’s Response
President Abraham Lincoln signed the proposed amendment—
unprecedented and resented by Congress—and sent it to the states for
ratification.52 The Thirteenth Amendment became a part of the
Constitution in December of 1865, when 27 states—three-fourths of the
36 states—ratified it.53 Mississippi did not ratify the Thirteenth
Amendment until 1995 and did not submit the official paperwork until
2013, after the Lincoln movie.54 With ratification, the new President
Andrew Johnson invited the Southern states to rejoin the Union, and the
states fully expected to do so. But as a Democrat who subscribed to the
Democratic view that this was a white man’s country, Andrew Johnson set
virtually no conditions on the Rebel states’ return to the Union and
Congress.55
Johnson opposed nearly all efforts to integrate newly freed slaves into
American life.56 He pardoned thousands of ex-Confederates from the
consequences of rebellion and returned to them the right to vote that
Congress had taken from Confederate officers and officials.57 He pushed
to restore Southern states swiftly to the Union and required no regulations
on race relations to be present in the new state constitutions—effectively
allowing Southern governments free rein over determining the roles and
status of African-Americans.58
Furthermore, Johnson did not issue any federal guarantees of the right
to vote for the former enslaved. He claimed to be protecting America, not
from ex-Confederates, but from radical Republicans and their AfricanAmerican allies.59 As a result, Southern states promptly selected their former
52. Passage, supra note 49.
53. Id.
54. Stephanie Condon, After 148 years, Mississippi finally ratifies 13th
Amendment, which banned slavery, CBS NEWS (Feb. 18, 2018, 10:59 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/after-148-years-mississippi-finally-ratifies-13thamendment-which-banned-slavery/ [https://perma.cc/KFT3-7L3Q].
55. The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, CONST. RIGHTS FOUND., http://www.
crf-usa.org/impeachment/impeachment-of-andrew-johnson.html [https://perma.cc/4
TLF-HB7Y] (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).
56. W. Fitzhugh Brundage, Rewconstruction and the Formerly Enslaved,
NAT’L HUMANITIES CTR., http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/freedom/18
65-1917/essays/reconstruction.htm [https://perma.cc/WF5N-NLXM] (last visited
Sept. 23, 2018).
57. The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, supra note 55.
58. Id.
59. H. LOWELL BROWN, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS IN
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 149 (2010); Elizabeth R. Varron, Andrew Johnson
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Secessionist and Confederate leaders to fill most of the seats they were
regaining.60 When the states sent these enemies of the Union as their
representatives to Washington D.C., however, the Republican-dominated
39th Congress rejected the credentials of every one of the Rebel states’
potential Senators and Representatives.61
Freedom is a powerful engine. Whatever meaning the Thirteenth
Amendment may have had in January of 1865, the South’s reaction to the
end of slavery changed the dynamics of a rush toward reunion. Although
African-Americans were defining and living their new lives with freedom,
the Southern states—which their Antebellum and Confederate leaders still
controlled—busily enacted thinly disguised versions of slavery.62 Known
as “Black Codes,” these systems gave white employers the power to
administer “moderate corporeal chastisement”—whipping.63 Traveling
without a pass from one’s employer was forbidden. In most states, it
became nearly impossible for African-Americans to rent land, market their
own produce, or seek effective legal redress against whites.64 Freed people
were not allowed to possess knives or firearms, buy or sell alcohol, or
preach the Gospel without a license from white authorities.65
More egregious regulations were mere replicas of slave code clauses,
with the substitution of “freedmen” for “slaves.” Section 40 of the New
Orleans Code went further still—it declared “free people of color ought
never to insult or strike white people . . . nor presume to think of

and the Legacy of the Civil War, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Mar. 2016),
http://americanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001
.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-11 [https://perma.cc/27L3-QDL8].
60. See, e.g., Christine Blackerby, What is Loyalty?: David Patterson’s Oath
of Office, NAT’L ARCHIVES (July 28, 2016), https://prologue.blogs.archives.gov
/2016/07/28/what-is-loyalty-david-pattersons-oath-of-office/ [https://perma.cc/C
LB2-2MJR].
61. David P. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383,
385–86 (2008).
62. For further information on Black Codes, see, e.g., T. B. WILSON, BLACK
CODES OF THE SOUTH (Univ. of Ala. Press 2000); WILLIAM COHEN, AT
FREEDOM'S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY AND THE SOUTHERN WHITE QUEST FOR
CONTROL, 1861-1915 (1991); Black Codes in the Former Confederate States,
SHOTGUN’S HOME OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, http://www.civilwarhome.com
/blackcodes.htm [https://perma.cc/9BAQ-RRNZ] (last updated Feb. 15, 2002).
63. See supra note 62.
64. See supra note 62.
65. See supra note 62.

202

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

themselves equal to the white.”66 The system would bind AfricanAmericans to the land, impoverished, uneducated, disenfranchised, and
unorganized, in perpetuity. White people who might have thought
differently were kept in line by a section of this code that made it a crime
for any of them to associate with any African-American “on terms of
equality.”67
It was this Southern, white action against the freed slaves that steadily
and rapidly—though not unanimously—propelled the nation toward
equality. The Chicago Tribune typified Northern Republican outrage over
the Black Codes:
We tell the white men of Mississippi that the men of the North
will convert the state of Mississippi into a frog pond before they
will allow any such laws to disgrace one foot of soil in which the
bones of our soldiers sleep and over which the flag of freedom
waves.68
Southern action thus actually fueled the Northern response and
intervention that Southerners scorned.
In reaction to the Black Codes, and despite misgivings about AfricanAmerican inferiority, Northern Republicans in the U.S. House and Senate
eventually embraced racially neutral suffrage as a legacy of emancipation,
and Congress worked on legislation to implement the Thirteenth
Amendment by outlawing “badges and incidents” of slavery.69 AfricanAmerican votes were also crucial in establishing competitive Republican
parties in the South once the ex-Confederate states rejoined the Union. 70
Congress took its first step toward this goal in late 1866 when it mandated
black voting rights in the District of Columbia and required Nebraska and
Colorado to implement race-neutral suffrage for admission to the Union.71

66. James E. Wainwirght, William Claiborne and New Orleans’s Battalion
of Color, 1803-1815: Race and the Limits of Federal Power in the Early Republic,
57 J. OF LA. HIST. ASS’N 5, 27 (2016).
67. See supra note 62.
68. CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 1, 1865.
69. See generally Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and
Incidents of Slavery, 14 J. CONST. L. 561 (2011).
70. HANES WALTON, JR. ET AL., THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN ELECTORATE: A
STATISTICAL HISTORY 31 (2012).
71. Id.
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C. The Fourteenth Amendment
When the 39th Congress reconvened the first week of December 1865,
it refused to accept the former Confederate states’ elected Representatives
under President Johnson’s lenient admittance to the Union.72 The former
Confederate states had defiantly elected the old planter elite and former
Confederates, such as the Confederate vice president Alexander Stephens,
to be their representatives.73 Thus, some called the 39th Congress the
“Rump Congress”74 because approximately 80 former Confederate state
representatives were not allowed to vote. In 1866, however, that so-called
Rump Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, and a two-thirds
vote passed the Amendment in both the House and Senate, as Article V of
the Constitution requires.75
In the midterm elections of 1866, Republicans made large gains. The
end result was the 1866 Civil Rights Act that began by declaring AfricanAmericans to be citizens of the United States, reversing the noxious ruling
in the 1857 Dred Scott case.76 The 1866 Civil Rights Act went on to ban
racial discrimination in making and enforcing contracts, buying and
selling property, suing and testifying in court, and generally guaranteed to
African-Americans the “full and equal benefit of all laws” and protection
against unequal “punishment, pains, and penalties.”77 Furthermore,
Congress enacted the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 over President

72. See Currie, supra note 61, at 385–86.
73. See Stephens, Alexander Hamilton, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE
U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=s0008
54 [https://perma.cc/CHH2-FL7Z] (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).
74. See, e.g., ELLIS PAXSON OBERHOLTZER, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES SINCE THE CIVIL WAR: 1865-68 164 (Macmillian Co. 1917).
75. See STEVEN HAHN, A NATION WITHOUT BORDERS: THE UNITED STATES
AND ITS WORLD IN AN AGE OF CIVIL WARS 1830-1910 (2016).
76. See Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by Enforcement
Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 8, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981–82 (2012))).
77. Id. § 1. See CHRISTIAN G. SAMITO, THE GREATEST AND GRANDEST ACT:
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO TODAY (S. Ill. Univ.
Press 2018).
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Johnson’s veto,78 which required African-American male suffrage within
the former Confederate states.79
The new Reconstruction Act, however, raised questions. Was it
constitutional? Was its guarantee of citizenship and equality “appropriate
legislation” to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery? To
resolve these questions, Congress began solidifying the guarantees by
putting them into the Constitution.
1. African-American Citizenship: Escaping the Dred Scott Decision
Before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the definition of
African-American citizenship was the one set by the Supreme Court in
1857. Chief Justice Roger Taney wrote the decision in Dred Scott v.
Sandford.80 The Court then ruled that African-Americans were not citizens
and had no rights. Dred Scott v. Sandford is the most reviled case in
Supreme Court history. The case is universally condemned for its
blundering partisanship, inventing so-called constitutional doctrine out of
whole cloth, and, not-so-incidentally, hastening the Civil War.
Above all, the case is forever infamous for the hateful words that
African-Americans “had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect.”81 If these words had been simply a historical observation, that
would have been enough, but Chief Justice Taney used them for the
unprecedented deed of fastening racial discrimination squarely into the
Constitution. The Constitution of the Founding Fathers included clauses
that drew a line between slaves and free people, but Chief Justice Taney,
joined by a majority of the Supreme Court, turned that line into a color
line, and declared explicitly that the “blessings of liberty” promised by the

78. President Johnson’s veto came as no surprise as he rejected ever other major
civil rights bill—14 in total. See Bills Vetoed by President Johnson, NAT’L PARK
SERV., https://www.nps.gov/anjo/learn/historyculture/vetoed-bills.htm [https://perma
.cc/5J4V-UF2A] (last updated Apr. 14, 2015) (calling President Johnson the “Veto
President”).
79. The Senate narrowly sustained one veto, his first one, of the second
Freedmen’s Bureau bill, but put most of that bill into the civil rights bill discussed
in the text. See Freedmen’s Bureau Acts of 1865 and 1866, U.S. SENATE ,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/FreedmensBurea
u.htm [https://perma.cc/ZP2N-3MPK] (last visited Sept. 23, 2018). He pocketvetoed two bills, which the Senate could not override. See generally Andrew
Johnson, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/reference/Legislation/Vetoes/Pre
sidents/Johnson A.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EL8-PXT6].
80. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
81. Id. at 407.
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Constitution to all free people, were somehow denied to all those of
African descent, even if free and even if born free of free parents.82
What led Chief Justice Taney to fill 25 pages establishing that Dred
Scott was not a citizen? Surely, it was not the limited question of whether
Scott had the “privilege” of bringing a suit in federal court. The answer
instead seems to lie in certain rights that Article IV of the Constitution
gives to citizens of one state traveling in other states, specifically certain
“privileges and immunities”—words later carried over from Article IV
and included in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Taney openly expressed his fear that if freed slaves were citizens, their
rights would include the following, as he listed them in 1857:
the right to enter every other State whenever they pleased, singly or
in companies, without pass or passport, and without obstruction, to
sojourn there as long as they pleased, to go where they pleased at
every hour of the day or night without molestation, unless they
committed some violation of law for which a white man would be
punished; and it would give them the full liberty of speech in public
and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might
speak; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep
and carry arms wherever they went. 83
These are rights the slave states denied to African-Americans, whether
enslaved or free. Chief Justice Taney intended to extend that lack of
freedom to all states, and the Supreme Court majority agreed.84
To achieve real freedom, Justice Tawney’s Dred Scott decision would
have to be overturned. A “New Birth of Freedom” is what Lincoln called
for in his Gettysburg address.85
In June of 1866, Congress approved a new constitutional amendment,
despite Democrats voting “no,” and sent it to the states for ratification as
the Fourteenth Amendment.86 The heart of the Amendment was in Section
1, which contained four distinct clauses.87 The first clause stated that “[a]ll
persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 412 (emphasis added).
Id. at 417.
See id.
See Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
See generally 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, LIBR. OF
CONGRESS (June 17, 2018), https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/14th
amendment.html [https://perma.cc/B8F2-KPV7].
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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wherein they reside.”88 Nearly all African-Americans in the country in
1866 had been born in the United States.
2. “All Persons Born . . . in the United States”: Birthright
Citizenship
Birthright citizenship in the United States applied not only to former
slaves, but also to the children of immigrants, regardless of whether their
parents were documented. It reinforced this idea of citizenship status by
declaring that “[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,”89
with the term “privileges and immunities” borrowed from the original
Constitution. This provision constitutionalized the guarantee of AfricanAmerican citizenship that Congress had created in the Civil Rights Act of
1866. The Amendment excluded Native Americans because they were
thought to have sovereignty as tribes, and this classification was not
changed until 1887 with the Dawes Act.90 The Act excluded children of
foreign diplomats’ wives, as well as children fathered by occupying
armies’ soldiers, though the United States has not been occupied since the
War of 1812.91
The concept of “birthright citizenship” is of extreme importance and
much debate, and criticism of former President Obama exists for not
propagating that American history. Ironically, birthright citizenship,
commonly known as jus soli, is one of the most unique arguments for
American exceptionalism. The United States and Canada—and now
countries in South America and Latin America—have birthright citizenship;
European countries do not offer birthright citizenship.92 It was the
Republican Party—the Party of Lincoln—that gave the country the
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Dawes Act, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–58).
91. Eric Foner, The Supreme Court and the History of Reconstruction—And
Vice-Versa, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1585 (2012); Eric Foner, An American
Birthright, NATION, Sept. 14/21, 2015, available at http://ericfoner.com/articles
/082715nation.html [https://perma.cc/9QQA-YFMJ]; Eric Foner, Who Is an
American? The Imagined Community in American History, 40 CENTENNIAL REV.
425 (1997); ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, THE EMBATTLED VOTE IN AMERICA: FROM THE
FOUNDING TO THE PRESENT (Harvard Univ. Press 2018).
92. Foner, An American Birthright, supra note 91; see also Countries Who
Offer Birthright Citizenship, WORLDATLAS, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles
/countries-who-offer-birthright-citizenship.html [https://perma.cc/AYA6-QPLE]
(last updated June 22, 2018).
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Fourteenth Amendment. Now, many of the leaders of the Party of Lincoln
are calling for revocation of the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
that recognizes children born of undocumented immigrants as citizens of the
United States.93
Citizenship became an issue in the United States only after the Civil
War; the original Constitution mentioned citizens, but did not delineate or
define who was a citizen. A 1790 law, however, restricted those who
wanted to become citizens to any “free white person.”94 Thus, from its
beginning, the United States linked race with citizenship. Slaves were
never considered part of the body politic, but in 1860, nearly half a million
free African-Americans lived in the United States. In the 1857 Dred Scott
decision, the Supreme Court declared that no black person could be a
citizen of the United States.95 The Emancipation Proclamation and the
nearly 200,000 African-Americans that fought for the Union in the Civil
War changed that equation.
The Fourteenth Amendment begins with the clear statement, “all
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside.”96 Stated above, the drafters intended the Fourteenth
Amendment to address the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision of 1857,
but legislators and advocates raised and discussed a number of issues—for
example, would it include the children of gypsies or the Chinese? Senator
Lyman Trumbell, a friend of Lincoln’s, chaired the Senate Judiciary
Committee and stated that it meant what it said: “all persons” born in the
United States would be citizens.97 Additionally, George William Curtis,
one of the founders of the Republican Party and an influential Republican
spokesman, proffered that the Fourteenth Amendment was part of that
spirit of the Declaration of Independence that changed the United States
from a government “for white people” to one “for mankind.”98

93. See generally Tom Donnelly, The GOP’s Birthright Citizenship FlipFlop, POLITICO MAG. (Aug. 23, 2015), https://www.politico.com/magazine
/story/2015/08/the-gops-birthright-citizenship-flip-flop-121646 [https://perma.cc
/E4MT-KSQJ].
94. Naturalization Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 103.
95. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
97. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2893 (May 30, 1866).
98. See Foner, The Supreme Court and the History of Reconstruction—And ViceVersa, supra note 91; Foner, An American Birthright, supra note 91; Foner, Who Is
an American? The Imagined Community in American History, supra note 91.
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3. “Illegal Immigrants”
At the end of the Civil War, there was essentially no regard for illegal
immigration; almost anyone who wanted to come to the United States was
welcome.99 Only later would the United States introduce restrictions on
lunatics, anarchists, prostitutes, and polygamists entering the country. In
1882, Congress prohibited all Chinese from coming to the United States.100
Thus, after 1882, the Chinese would be the closest analogy to illegal
immigrants, or undocumented workers, at issue today.
In 1898, the U.S. Supreme Court spoke directly to the issue of children
born to Chinese parents in the United States in United States v. Wong Kim
Ark.101 The United States government tried to keep Wong Kim Ark out of
the country when he returned from a visit to China on the theory that because
of his Chinese parents, he was subject to the jurisdiction of China and not
the United States.102 The government decided that he did not fit within the
words of the Fourteenth Amendment that specify that a person must be
“subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” meaning subject to United States
jurisdiction.103 Instead, the Court argued that part of the Fourteenth
Amendment refers to the children of diplomats, not individuals like Wong
Kim Ark, whose parents were working in San Francisco when he was
born.104 Ark’s case dealt with the argument that being born to foreign
parents disqualifies children from citizenship, and the Supreme Court
declared that Wong Kim Ark was a citizen of the United States.105
Interestingly, the supporter of African-American rights in the Civil
Rights Cases of 1883, as well as Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896, Justice John
Marshall Harlan, appointed in 1877 and known as the “Great Dissenter,”
was one of the dissenting justices who supported the United States’s right to
deny Wong Kim Ark entrance into the United States and birthright
citizenship.106

99. See generally Rise of Industrial America, 1876-1900, LIBR. OF CONGRESS,
http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/present
ations/timeline/riseind/chinimms/ [https://perma.cc/LUN9-KSE3].
100. Id.
101. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
102. Id. at 649–50.
103. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
104. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 682.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 705–32 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
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4. Voting Rights
In the mid-nineteenth century, the right to vote was closely tied to
citizenship and the ideas of manhood.107 Congress’s debates surrounding
the Fourteenth Amendment illustrated that members of Congress did not
believe that the right to vote was among a citizen’s “privileges and
immunities.” The Senate rejected a similar provision to the Fourteenth
Amendment with a vote of 37–10 that stated, “No state, in prescribing the
qualifications requisite for electors therein, shall discriminate against any
persons on account of color or race.”108 Republican Senator Jacob Howard
presented this argument clearly, explaining that voting was a governmentgranted privilege, not an inherent natural right.109 The last clause of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment also prohibited states from
denying equal protection of the law.110 Although the Fourteenth
Amendment could be used to prohibit racially discriminatory voting laws,
its lack of clarity fostered narrow court constructions that limited its
application to suffrage until the late 20th century.
The Fourteenth Amendment did provide sovereign power to the
federal government over the states and their various subdivisions as clearly
stated in Section 2: “the power to enforce . . . by appropriate legislation,”
changed the federal government’s power to enforce rights guaranteed to
citizens by the Constitution that had been understood previously to only
be enforced by the state in which the citizen lived.111 Chief Justice John
Marshall’s 1833 opinion in Barron v. Baltimore held that the Bill of
Rights, the first ten amendments to the Constitution, applied only to the
federal government and not to the states or the states’ political
subdivisions.112 Mississippi legislators feared this enforcement clause
would be “a dangerous grant of power” and “might admit federal
legislation in respect to persons, denizens and inhabitants of the state.”113
The legislatures in both Alabama and South Carolina were alarmed that
107. See Orville Vernon Burton, Tempering Society’s Looking Glass:
Coreccting Misconceptions About the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Securing
American Democracy, 76 LA. L. REV. 1 (2015).
108. 216 SENATE DOCUMENTS 219 (Mar. 9, 1866) (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office
1865).
109. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 185 (1866).
110. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
111. Id. § 2.
112. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
113. MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE
ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 230 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2001).
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the Fourteenth Amendment “confer[ed] upon Congress the power to
Legislate upon the political status of the Freedmen.”114
Members of the House and Senate focused more time and energy on
the second and third sections of the Amendment than the first. Section 2
of the Fourteenth Amendment was the first ever federal enactment to
address the right to vote for African-Americans.115 It did so indirectly, not
by granting the right to vote, but by reducing “the basis of representation”
in Congress of any state that denied or abridged the right to vote of any
“qualified voters,” defined as all-male inhabitants over 21 who were not
guilty of a disqualifying crime.116 As such, Section 2 had substantial
implications for suffrage and representation. Although it did not directly
compel or force former Confederate states to enfranchise black men, it did
seem to punish racially motivated disenfranchisement through reduced
representation. If African-Americans were not allowed to vote, then their
population was not to be counted for representation in Congress.
Proponents of this provision argued that it would keep the Southern
states from benefiting from the elimination of the Three-Fifths Clause of
the Constitution. The idea, according to radical Republicans such as
Thaddeus Stevens, was to give the Southern states a choice—grant
universal suffrage or lose their power—forcing the states to be always a
minority in the national government. The United States, however, never
enforced Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment—it remains unenforced
today.117
5. Sections Three, Four, and Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
The last few sections of the Amendment are simpler. Section 3 of the
Amendment declares:
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil
or military, under the United States, or under any state, who,
having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as
an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state
legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to
114. HAHN, supra note 75, at 308.
115. A voting law for the District of Columbia was passed in January 1867.
Andrew Glass, Congress expands suffrage in D.C. on Jan. 8, 1867, POLITICO (Jan.
8, 2008, 5:57 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2008/01/congress-expandssuffrage-in-dc-on-jan-8-1867-007771 [https://perma.cc/4LLB-DBGY].
116. Id.
117. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
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support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or
comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of
two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.118
Section 3 punished secessionists by denying almost all former U.S.
government officials that supported the Confederacy the right to vote or
hold any public office.119 In 1872, Congress softened this impact and
allowed all secessionists, except for the former top officials, to hold public
office and vote.120 In 1876, Congress removed sanctions for all former
Confederates.121
Section 4 of the Amendment also deals with the former Confederacy
by requiring repudiation of Confederate debt. This section asserts:
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and
bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall
not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim
for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts,
obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.122
Lastly, Section 5 repeats Congress’s enforcement power, mirroring
the language used in the Thirteenth Amendment and stating, “Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.”123
6. Ratification
The Fourteenth Amendment instituted a vast and critical change to the
distribution of government power. The majority in Congress wanted the
federal government to exhibit its “strong arm of power, outstretched from

118. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
119. See id.
120. ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, THE EMBATTLED VOTE IN AMERICA: FROM THE
FOUNDING TO THE PRESENT (Harvard Univ. Press 2018).
121. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863–1877 272–78, 294, 412–13, 417, 446–47 (Harper Perennial Modern
Classics 1988); LICHTMAN, supra note 120.
122. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
123. Id. § 5.
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the central authority.”124 Even more than the Thirteenth Amendment, this
change in the Constitution redefined how power is delegated. The extent
of a citizen’s social, civil, and political rights, and whether those rights
were separate or unitary, remained open to debate; but the Constitution
now committed the power of the federal government to the equal extension
of those rights.
Congress sent the Fourteenth Amendment to the states for ratification,
and in short order, the following states refused to ratify it: Texas, Georgia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Delaware,
and Maryland.125 Had it not been for the intransigence and unrepentant
course these former Confederate states pursued, significant political
change might have been delayed, or altogether derailed, in the South. As
it was, Congressman James Garfield of Ohio126 declared that military
authority was necessary to “plant liberty on the ruins of slavery.” 127
Congress felt bound to a higher purpose than a simple reconciliation of the
sections.
7. The Reconstruction Act
Consequently, as a result of this higher purpose, Congress enacted the
Reconstruction Act, putting the Rebel states under federal military
control.128 The Reconstruction Act authorized new state constitutions, and
United States military commanders took charge of registering all male
voters to elect delegates to state conventions.129 Senator Charles Sumner,
an ardent supporter of black rights, believed the ballot ensured AfricanAmericans’ citizenship and effective protection against white

124. LINCOLN LESSONS: REFLECTIONS ON AMERICA’S GREATEST LEADER 87
(Frank J. Williams & William D. Pederson eds., S. Ill. Univ. Press 2009).
125. See generally Ratification of Constitutional Amendments, U.S. CONST.,
https://www.usconstitution.net/constamrat.html [https://perma.cc /Y8HL-CNVL]
(last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
126. Garfield was the President for a brief time in 1881 before he was
assassinated. See James Garfield, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov
/about-the-white-house/presidents/james-garfield/ [https://perma.cc/TBT8-Y8T9]
(last visited Aug. 18, 2018).
127. JAMES GARFIELD, 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES ABRAM GARFIELD 249,
(Burke A. Hinsdale ed., 1882).
128. See The Reconstruction Acts: 1867, TEX. ST. LIBR. & ARCHIVES COMM’N,
https://www.tsl.texas.gov/ref/abouttx/secession/reconstruction.html [https://perma.cc
/LVX5-8J9F] (last updated Aug. 25, 2011).
129. Id.
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supremacy.130 Believing suffrage would be “immortal,” he naively wrote,
“The right of suffrage once given can never be taken away.”131
It is hard to imagine a more momentous occasion, at once deeply
conservative and boldly revolutionary, fraught with pathos and irony.
African-Americans, most of them illiterate former slaves, responded
overwhelmingly, often marching in masses to the very spot where they had
been whipped or sold and casting ballots that would determine the political
fate of their families, their fellows, and even their former masters.132
Louisiana was typical—with a fair and efficient system of registration,
approximately 90% of African-American men of voting age in the state
registered to vote in 1867.133 In November of 1867 in South Carolina,
80,832 African-Americans and 46,929 whites were registered to vote.134
Across the South, whites who thought the newly freed slaves would not
bother voting were dramatically proven wrong.
The newly adopted state constitutions required by the Reconstruction
Act provided for universal male suffrage. These state constitutions,
adopted in 1868 and 1869, were forward-looking, providing free public
school systems, homestead protection, and married women’s rights,
among other provisions.135 The new state legislatures also ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.136
130. Letter from Charles Sumner to Theodore Tilton (Apr. 18, 1867), in 2
SELECTED LETTERS OF CHARLES SUMNER 394 (Northeastern 1990).
131. Id. at 394.
132. See generally Marsha J. Tyson Darling, A Right Deferred: African
American Voter Suppression after Reconstruction, GILDER LEHRMAN INST. OF
AM. HIST., https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-now/right-deferred-africanamerican-voter-suppression [https://perma.cc/SUT8-S629] (last visited Sept. 30,
2018).
133. MYRNA PÉREZ, VOTER PURGES 31, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (2008),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Voter.Purg
es.no%20app.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UZY-Q8Q9].
134. BURTON, THE AGE OF LINCOLN, supra note 12, at 276–77.
135. See FONER, supra note 121, at 316–32; JOSEPH A. RANNEY, IN THE WAKE
OF SLAVERY: CIVIL WAR, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
SOUTHERN LAW 89–92 (Praeger 2006); DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, THE WARS OF
RECONSTRUCTION: THE BRIEF, VIOLENT HISTORY OF AMERICA'S MOST
PROGRESSIVE ERA (Bloomsbury Press 2014); BURTON, THE AGE OF LINCOLN,
supra note 12, at 282–88.
136. “On July 28, 1868, the [Fourteenth] Amendment to the United States
Constituion was ratified.” 14th Amendment to the Constitution Was Ratified July
28, 1868, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://www.americaslibrary.gov/jb/recon/jb
_recon_revised_1.html [https://perma.cc/JCL2-PA3Y] (last visited Sept. 30,
2018). Kentucky did not ratify the Fourteenth Amendment until 1976, and some
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D. The Fifteenth Amendment
With the recalcitrance of the former Confederates, many thought the
best way to protect this new birth of freedom was enfranchisement—the
power of the ballot. Extending the ballot in the Rebel states also raised the
question: why not in the other states?
At the outset of the Civil War, only five states in the nation, all in New
England, permitted African-Americans to vote on the same basis as
whites.137 Nineteenth century political thought was divided on whether
suffrage was a right of citizenship.138 Many argued that voting was a
privilege and that democracy could work only when suffrage was based
on education, property, and citizenship.139 Because citizenship imposed
responsibility as well as conferred rights, republicanism excluded those
who were “dependent” on others: insane persons, paupers, children,
women, and enslaved workers.140 Many states imposed additional suffrage
restrictions, denying the right to Chinese, illiterates, and those too poor to
pay property taxes.141 Fortunately, compelling voices articulated a
different vision.142 Frederick Douglass, for instance, declared that the right
to vote was “the keystone to the arch of human liberty.”143
To secure the right to vote nationwide, Congress proposed the
Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution, stating that, “[T]he right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.”144 In the second clause, the Fifteenth Amendment
articulated the now-familiar congressional enforcement clause, stating that
“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.”145
northern states balked as well. New Jersey withdrew ratification in 1868 and
ratified only in 2003. Oregon also withdrew ratification and only re-ratified in
1973. Ohio rescinded ratification in 1868 and only re-ratified in 2003.
137. See generally Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/introduction-federal-voting-rights-laws [https://per
ma.cc/L6KL-LD94] (last updated Aug. 16, 2018).
138. BURTON, THE AGE OF LINCOLN, supra note 12, at 278.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.; FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM (Miller,
Orton & Mulligan 1855).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
145. Id.
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Congress proposed the Fifteenth Amendment in early 1869 and
ratified it in early 1870—with the enthusiastic backing of the new
President, Ulysses S. Grant.146 Grant called upon Iowa as “the bright
Radical star” to grant suffrage to its African-American citizens, and
Iowans met Grant’s challenge.147 In the South, all of the former
Confederate states approved the right to vote—except Tennessee, which
finally ratified it in 1997—as well as states in the North and West.148 The
Fifteenth Amendment eradicated racial discrimination in voting across the
United States.
Suddenly, the Constitution defined the new birth of freedom—
citizenship and the right to vote. With citizenship secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment and the right to vote secured by the Fifteenth,
African-Americans could protect themselves from their former owners
through the rule of law, shape those laws by standing for political office,
and choose their own leaders with free debate and an honest ballot. With
the Fifteenth Amendment backing the new Southern state constitutions
that provided universal male suffrage, black political participation
mushroomed.
Holding office soon followed voting, including minor offices in
various places, as well as state legislative seats in several states, and
statewide offices, particularly in South Carolina and Louisiana. Two
African-American Mississippians were U.S. Senators and 14 AfricanAmericans served in the U.S. House of Representatives in the 1870s.149
146. Joan Waugh, Ulysses S. Grant: Impact and Legacy, MILLER CTR.,
https://millercenter.org/president/grant/impact-and-legacy [https://perma.cc/FJU5MH76] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
147. Stephen E. Maizlish, Book Review, 43 ANNALS OF IOWA 159 (reviewing
ROBERT R. DYKSTRA, BRIGHT RADICAL STAR: BLACK FREEDOM AND WHITE
SUPREMACY ON THE HAWKEYE FRONTIER (Harvard U. Press 1993)).
148. See generally Ratification of Constitutional Amendments, supra note 125.
149. ERIC FONER, FREEDOM’S LAWMAKERS: A DIRECTORY OF BLACK
OFFICEHOLDERS DURING RECONSTRUCTION (1993); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 355–63 (Harper Perennial
Modern Classics 1988); Xi Wang, Black Suffrage, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
RECONSTRUCTION ERA 82 (Richard Zuczek ed., 2006); STEVEN HAHN, A NATION
UNDER OUR FEET 219 (Belknap Press 2005); BURTON, THE AGE OF LINCOLN, supra
note 12, at 282–83. See also HOWARD N. RABINOWITZ, SOUTHERN BLACK LEADERS
OF THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA (Univ. of Ill. Press 1982). Several other AfricanAmericans served in the House of Representatives in the late 1880s and 1890s. The
last one, George White (N.C.), left in early 1901 with a final speech saying, “This
is perhaps the Negroes' temporary farewell to the American Congress, but let me
say, Phoenix-like he will rise up some day and come again.” Congressional Record,
56th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 34, pt. 2, at 1635–36, 1638 (Gov’t Printing Office, 1901).
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African-Americans in the South were almost unanimously Republican.150
Local white allies joined them in the Republican Party, scornfully called
“scalawags,” and some—though not as many as usually portrayed—who
were newly arrived and derisively labeled “carpetbaggers” because they
supposedly carried all their belongings in a cheap carpetbag satchel, had
come to the South to enrich themselves at the expense of the southern
people. In fact, scholars have demonstrated that Northerners who came to
the South during Reconstruction were well educated, mostly middle class,
and very respectable.151 African-American political strength, in voting and
office-holding, led to some economic progress as well.152
III. RESISTANCE TO AFRICAN-AMERICAN PROGRESS
Although African-American progress stimulated cooperation from
some white people, it prompted extreme violence from others. Fletcher
Hodges, a prominent local landowner, offered a cash reward for the death
of African-American Benjamin Franklin Randolph, a Methodist Episcopal
clergyman and Republican state senator representing Orangeburg, South
Carolina.153 In October of 1868, three white men murdered Randolph in
broad daylight in front of witnesses in Hodges, South Carolina, but no one
ever identified the assassins.154 In 1870 in Sumter County, Alabama, men
killed Richard Burke, a prominent legislator and black educator who had
announced that black men had the same right to carry arms as white
Congressman White’s speech is available online at An Online Reference Guide to
African-American History, U. OF WASH., http://www .blackpast.org/1901-georgeh-whites-farewell-address-congress [https://perma.cc/4AB6-CGTP] (last visited
Aug. 18, 2018). Black Congressmen came from northern states beginning in 1928,
but no African-American came from a southern state until Barbara Jordan (Tex.)
was elected in 1972.
150. See generally Karen Grisby Bates, Why Did Black Voters Flee The
Republican Party In The 1960s?, NPR (July 14, 2014, 5:05 AM), https://www
.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/07/14/331298996/why-did-black-voters-flee-therepublican-party-in-the-1960s [https://perma.cc/PZF4-LPXT].
151. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863–1877 294 (Harper Perennial Modern Classics 1988).
152. Id.
153. See ALLEN B. BALLARD, ONE MORE DAY’S JOURNEY: THE STORY OF A
FAMILY AND A PEOPLE 137 (2011).
154. JOEL WILLIAMSON, AFTER SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN SOUTH CAROLINA
DURING RECONSTRUCTION, 1861–1877 (1965); RICHARD ZUCZEK, STATE OF
REBELLION: RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH CAROLINA (1996); GEORGE B.
TINDALL, SOUTH CAROLINA NEGROES: 1877–1900 (1970); BERNARD EDWARD
POWERS, BLACK CHARLESTONIANS: A SOCIAL HISTORY, 1822–1885 (1994).
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men.155 Violence was always a component of United States history, but
after the Civil War, terrorism exploded as Southern slaveholders no longer
protected African-Americans as their own personal chattel property. Many
formed outlaw groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan and the White Knights
of the Camellia.
A. Combatting the Ku Klux Klan
Contrary to the stereotypical image of “poor whites” who hated
freedmen as economic rivals, Klansmen represented all classes of white
society in the South.156 The Klan attacked the fledgling democratic
institutions that African-Americans and white Republican allies had begun
to create.157 Night-riding gangs turned their attention to political activists
and appointees, county sheriffs, legislators, and voters.158 The Klan and its
allies struck at African-American churches and smaller groups of citizens,
but only groups they outnumbered.159 They avoided any clash with federal
troops. White vigilantes determined that the rule of law grounded in
constitutional reform would not be allowed to triumph in the South.160
White southerners heartily asserted that such terrorism was minimal and
that they would take care of the problem, but Supreme Court Justice
Samuel Miller, appointed by President Lincoln in 1862, wrote his
Southern brother-in-law in 1867, challenging him on such a lie:
Show me a single white man that has been punished in a State
court for murdering a negro or a Union man. Show me any public
meeting has been had to express indignation at such conduct . . . .
Show me the first public address or meeting of Southern men in
which the massacres of New Orleans or Memphis have been
condemned . . . . There may be two sides to the stories, but there
was but one side in the party that suffered at both places, and the
single truth is undenied that not a rebel or secessionist was hurt in
either case, while from 30 to 50 negroes and Union white men
were shot down precludes all doubt as to who did it and why it
155. ERIC FONER, FREEDOM’S LAWMAKERS: A DIRECTORY OF BLACK
OFFICEHOLDERS DURING RECONSTRUCTION 132 (LSU Press 1996).
156. See generally Ku Klux Klan, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www
.britannica.com/topic/Ku-Klux-Klan [https://perma.cc/B4G5-9GEE] (last visited
Sept. 30, 2018).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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was done.161
Killing in the post-Civil War South was almost entirely one-sided—white
murders of black victims and their white Republican allies.162
The federal government adopted new federal laws after the Fifteenth
Amendment and intended them to be pillars of enforcement and
protection.163 The Enforcement Act of 1870 guaranteed the right to vote in
all elections without racial discrimination, targeting state election officials
with a set of prohibitions of specific racially discriminatory practices.164
The Act also contained a new innovation: a section aimed at private
terrorism, making it a federal crime “to conspire or go in disguise or upon
the public highway” for the purpose of interfering with any person’s “free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him
by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”165
A year later, in 1871, following extensive hearings about outrages
across the South, Congress enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act.166 The primary
goal of the Ku Klux Klan Act was to organize mob terror that intimidated
or overwhelmed the struggling new state or local governments, and
sometimes even federal officials.167 The Act defined interference with
government functioning as insurrection or rebellion and authorized
presidential action to suppress it, including authorization to suspend
habeas corpus where needed.168 The Act also expanded on the 1870 Act
by making it a crime “to conspire or go in disguise on the highway” for
the purpose of “preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any
161. MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN
MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA 147 (2003).
162. See generally Lynching in America, AM. EXPERIENCE, https://www.pbs.org
/wgbh/americanexperience/features/emmett-lynching-america/ [https://perma.cc/H
3VT-YTVU] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
163. See Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by Enforcement
Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 8, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981–82 (2012)).
164. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 8, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–82).
165. FONER, supra note 121, at 454–59 (Harper Perennial Modern Classics,
1988); Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by Enforcement Act of
1870, ch. 114, § 8, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
1981–82 (2012)).
166. See The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/15032451486?ret=True
[https://perma.cc/YNQ8-YFC5] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
167. Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 31, 17 Stat. 13.
168. Id.
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State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within the State
or Territory the equal protection of the laws.”169
Other provisions and laws supplemented these protections. In
particular, several provisions provided remedies that victims of violence
could invoke themselves, allowing the victim to bring a lawsuit for
damages and make the violator pay for the victim’s lawyer—a familiar
rule in English law but virtually unprecedented in the American legal
system. Another provision allowed a person facing trial in a state court to
remove the entire case to federal court if he could not enforce his “equal
rights” in the state court.170
Thus, the new birth of freedom had a constitutional and legal
foundation. The guiding principles were citizenship and equality, and
there were two modes of protection: prosecution by the federal
government and self-help through the power to vote. As the 1870s began,
the federal government actively enforced the new laws.171 In one year,
there were more than 1,200 civil rights prosecutions under the
Enforcement Act of 1870 and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.172 In another
year, the federal government spent $3,000,000 dispatching official
observers to state elections.173 President Grant, acting with authorization
contained in the newly enacted Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, suspended the
writ of habeas corpus in nine South Carolina counties, and a series of mass
Klan trials broke the back of the Klan in that state.174 Although convictions
were few in number, many Klansmen fled the state, and the organization
all but dried up in South Carolina.175 In 1870, at the last official meeting
of the American Anti-Slavery Society, Frederick Douglass proffered, “I
seem to be living in a new world.”176
The South was in turmoil, but it seemed there were tools to deal with
it—until the Supreme Court ruled otherwise.

169. Id.
170. See Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by Enforcement
Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 8, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981–82 (2012)).
171. See generally LOU FALKNER WILLIAMS, THE GREAT SOUTH CAROLINA
KU KLUX KLAN TRIALS, 1871–1872 (2004).
172. See generally id.
173. See generally id.
174. See generally id.
175. See generally id.
176. SHARMAN APT. RUSSELL ET AL., FREDERICK DOUGLASS: ABOLITIONIST
EDITOR 71 (Chelsea House Pub. 2004).
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B. United States v. Hall
In the fall of 1870, a white mob invaded a political meeting of AfricanAmerican farmers in the town of Eutaw, Alabama, killing two men and
wounding several others.177 John Hall and William Pettigrew were
indicted under the Enforcement Act of 1870 for “band[ing] and
conspir[ing] together” to keep their victims from exercising their First
Amendment rights to free speech and free assembly. 178 In court, the
defendants argued that the federal government had no power to prosecute
them for two reasons: first, because the First Amendment did not apply to
the states; and second, because even if it did apply to the states, it did not
apply to the actions of private individuals.179 The case came before Judge
William B. Woods.180 Woods came from Ohio as a Union general in the
Civil War, stayed in the South, and became a federal judge earlier the same
year.181
Because United States v. Hall was one of the first cases tried under the
Enforcement Act, for guidance, Judge Woods wrote to Joseph P. Bradley,
the Supreme Court Justice assigned to supervise the lower federal courts
in Alabama and other southern states. Bradley wrote back that the
Fourteenth Amendment, in his opinion, authorized “direct federal
intervention” to protect citizens’ fundamental rights.182
In a ruling that used language directly from Bradley’s letter, Woods
decreed that although the defendants would have prevailed in the past, the
Fourteenth Amendment had revolutionized the Constitution and rendered
their arguments invalid.183 In particular, the Fourteenth Amendment barred
a state from abridging a citizen’s “privileges or immunities”; whatever the
“privileges or immunities” of a U.S. citizen were, he continued, they
certainly included those contained in the First Amendment.184 Because the
Fourteenth Amendment specifically gave Congress the power to pass
appropriate enforcement legislation, this federal law that authorized direct
177. See generally United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79 (S.D. Ala. 1871).
178. Id. at 79.
179. Id. at 80.
180. See id.
181. See generally William Burnham Woods (Aug. 3, 1824 - May 14, 1887),
SUP. CT. OF OHIO & OHIO JUD. SYS., https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/MJC
/places/wbWoods.asp [https://perma.cc/5XSP-46LA] (last visited Sept. 30,
2018).
182. S.G.F. Spackman, American Federalism and the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
10 J. AM. STUDIES 313, 323 n.34 (1976).
183. See generally Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79.
184. Id.

2018]

THE CREATION AND DESTRUCTION

221

prosecution of individuals who interfered with “privileges or immunities”
was within Congress’s power.185
Woods’s interpretation could have changed history. It read the
Fourteenth Amendment broadly and showed that the Enforcement Act of
1870 could be an effective tool against white terrorism. By the 1872
election, however, when Republican Ulysses S. Grant was reelected
president with a minority of the white vote, the post-war zeal for reform
that had animated many in the country began to wane. By 1874, the
Democrats had retaken the House of Representatives, where they were in
a position to block further progress.186 Anticipating this resistance, the
outgoing Republican majority passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875 on its
very last day in office.187
In 1872, the Supreme Court’s views also shifted. The Supreme Court
played a major role in undoing the Fourteenth Amendment as the nation
began its downward spiral from the New Birth of Freedom to Jim Crow.
In the 1870s and 1880s, the Court, unwilling to accept that the Constitution
had been turned upside-down, neutered all three wartime amendments and
eviscerated Congress’s enforcement laws.
IV. THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES
The Supreme Court’s first major encounter with the new
Cconstitutional amendments did not involve race or Reconstruction, but
rather a business dispute about livestock slaughtering. Nevertheless, the
way the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment would
have calamitous consequences for African-Americans. In fact, the Court’s
ruling in the Slaughter-House Cases still causes problems in constitutional
interpretation today.
In 1869, to combat filth and disease, the Louisiana Legislature
designated a single location for all animal slaughtering in New Orleans
and gave one company a 25-year license to build and operate a
slaughterhouse there.188 All butchers in the city were required to use that
facility and a number of butchers challenged the law, arguing that it
185. Id.
186. See generally On this Day, N.Y. TIMES, https://archive.nytimes.com
/www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/harp/0721.html [https://perma.cc
/VYR9-FZ5K] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
187. See generally The Civil Rights Act of 1875, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1851-1900/The
-Civil-Rights-Act-of-1875/ [https://perma.cc/5M4D-ZGHR] (last visited Sept. 30,
2018).
188. 1869 La. Acts No. 118.
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created a monopoly and threatened their livelihoods.189 Their cases were
decided by the Supreme Court in early 1873, under the collective name
Slaughter-House Cases.190
The Court’s membership had turned over completely since Dred
Scott.191 Presidents Lincoln and Grant appointed seven Republicans of the
nine Justices; there were no Southerners.192 Still, a few of the Justices had
records supporting the rights of African-Americans; most owed their seats
to business or geographical considerations.
If the case had involved race or Reconstruction, it might have turned
out differently. The Court used five full pages to provide a sympathetic
history of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, ranging
from the valiant service of African-American soldiers in the Union army
to the ignoble Black Codes.193 The Court asserted the “one pervading
purpose” in the three Amendments was “the freedom of the slave race”
and “the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over
him.”194 Most significantly, the Court recognized that the new
Amendments made major changes in the constitutional structure of
government: “additional guarantees of human rights,” “additional powers
to the Federal government,” and “additional restraints upon those of the
States.”195
The New Orleans butchers, white Democrats, were not the reason for
this new freedom, but they claimed the words of the Amendments still
applied to them.196 A majority of the Court, however, believed the butchers
were trying to take advantage of an amendment designed for the benefit of
others.197 The butchers raised several arguments that the Court quickly
dismissed, but the main argument was that their ability to carry on their

189. See generally Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
190. Id.; see generally RONALD M. LABBÉ & JONATHAN LURIE, THE
SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2003).
191. See generally Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. OF U.S., https://www
.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/F39W-TACT] (last
visited Sept. 30, 2018).
192. See generally id.
193. See generally Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36.
194. Id. at 71.
195. Id. at 67–68.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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business was a “privilege or immunity,” which Louisiana had “abridged”
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.198
The Court could have relied on a previous interpretation of similar
words—“privileges and immunities”—as they appeared elsewhere in the
Constitution, specifically in Article IV. There, the Court had interpreted
the phrase very broadly, to include those “privileges and immunities” that
were “fundamental, which belong of right to the citizens of free
governments”—such as the right to acquire and possess property. Such
was the interpretation the butchers were hoping the Court would use.199
Instead, a 5–4 majority followed a bizarre course of reasoning that
interpreted the same words to mean one thing in one clause of the
Constitution and the opposite in another.200 The majority took the first
sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment—“All persons born or naturalized
in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the state wherein they reside”—to mean that each
person had two separate identities, with separate privileges in each one:
“there is a citizenship of the United states and a citizenship of a State,
which are distinct from each other.”201
The Court did not stop there; it held that national and state citizenship
privileges were mutually exclusive, thus, any privilege of the former was
automatically excluded from the privileges of the latter.202 Because state
citizenship privileges were so vast, the only privileges left for national
citizenship were a few limited ones, such as the right to travel to the
nation’s capital or to be protected on the high seas.203
The Court read the Fourteenth Amendment’s “privileges or
immunities” clause this way in order to prevent the national government
from overwhelming the states. With this interpretation, the majority, while
recognizing the grave events that had provoked the Amendments,204
adhered to the Constitution they had always known, with strict separation
of state and federal roles. The Fourteenth Amendment, they claimed, did
not change the fact that most rights “must rest for their security and

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Although the Supreme Court has never overruled the Slaughter-House
Cases, every serious modern scholar has rejected its reasoning as faithless to the
words and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment.
201. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 79–80.
204. The complexity is revealed in the five pages about the rights of AfricanAmericans contained in the decision.
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protection where they ha[d] heretofore rested” with the states.205 Any other
reading of the new Amendment “radically change[d] the whole theory of
the relations of the State and Federal governments to each other and of
both these governments to the people.”206
The four dissenting Justices, ridiculing the majority’s approach,
retorted that this change from state sovereignty to federal sovereignty and
federal authority over the states was precisely the object of the new
Amendments.207 What they conferred were not new rights but new modes
of protecting existing rights, namely, federal protection against state
hostility. As responses to “the spirit of lawlessness, mob violence and
sectional hate,” Justice Swayne claimed that the new Amendments rose
“to the dignity of a new Magna Carta.”208 Justice Page then pointed out
that, if the majority was right about the Fourteenth Amendment, “it was a
vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most
unnecessarily excited Congress and the people upon its passage.”209
Justice Samuel Miller, the Court’s intellectual leader and author of the
majority opinion, generally supported the civil rights of AfricanAmericans. Reacting acidly to the Black Codes passed by the Southern
states after the Civil War, he wrote to a friend that:
[T]he pretence is that the negro won’t work without he is
compelled to do so, and this pretence is made in a country and by
the white people, where the negro has done all the work for four
generations and the white man makes a boast of the fact that he
will not labour.210
Miller may well have thought that restricting the “privileges or
immunities” clause left ample room for protecting African-Americans,
especially under the “equal protection” clause and the specific grant of
power to Congress to enact enforcement laws.
It was dissenting Justice Swayne whose point of view proved
prophetic. He wrote that any government unable to protect fundamental
privileges and rights was “glaringly defective,” ending his opinion with a
doleful premonition: “I earnestly hope that the consequences to follow
205. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 75.
206. Id. at 78.
207. Id. at 83–130.
208. Id. at 125 (Swayne, J., dissenting)
209. Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
210. MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN
MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA (2003); Letter
from Justice Samuel Miller to WPB (Jan. 11, 1866) (emphasis added).
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may prove less serious and far-reaching than the minority fear they will
be.”211 Unfortunately, those consequences were to be far worse than any
Cassandra could have predicted.212 In fact, it was fewer than three days
before such consequences were set in motion, a thousand miles away from
the Supreme Court in Washington, D.C.
V. UNITED STATES V. CRUIKSHANK
In the sleepy hamlet of Colfax, Louisiana, the whites that held
contested offices refused to hand over the courthouse keys to the newlyelected Republicans.213 Late one night, a group of these victorious
Republicans, one African-American and the rest white, went to the
courthouse, tore off a shutter, and hoisted a young boy into the crevice.214
The boy crawled in and opened the front door, and the Republicans seized
the courthouse.215
Beginning the next morning, white Democrats prepared to besiege the
building while two dozen Republicans, mostly African-American, stood
guard outside the courthouse door.216 Over the next several weeks the
families of many of those guarding the courthouse joined the contingent
inside the building.217 By Easter Sunday two weeks later, about 300
African-Americans were in the courthouse, half of them women and
children.218 A force of similar size, mostly former Confederate soldiers
from neighboring districts, had gathered in opposition, determined to
suppress the “negro riot.”219
On Easter, the standoff reached its boiling point.220 The Democrats
ordered the people in the courthouse to evacuate all of the women and

211. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 129–30.
212. See generally Cassandra, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/Cassandra [https://perma.cc/M7RG-NZCD] (last visited
Oct. 1, 2018).
213. See generally United States v. Cruikshank, 35 F. Cas. 707 (C.C.D. La.
1874).
214. CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008); LEEANNA
KEITH, THE COLFAX MASSACRE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF BLACK POWER, WHITE
TERROR, AND THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008).
215. See LANE, supra note 214; KEITH, supra note 214.
216. See LANE, supra note 214; KEITH, supra note 214.
217. See LANE, supra note 214; KEITH, supra note 214.
218. See LANE, supra note 214; KEITH, supra note 214.
219. See LANE, supra note 214; KEITH, supra note 214.
220. See LANE, supra note 214; KEITH, supra note 214.

226

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

children because they would be attacking in 30 minutes.221 Most obeyed,
although some of the most vulnerable were unable to make it out by the
deadline.222 Just after noon, the former Confederates fired their cannons,
and for two hours, the two sides exchanged volleys.223 Eventually, the
Democrats prevailed, however, hunting down on horseback those
Republicans who fled the courthouse for the nearby forest.224 Then they
laid fire to the courthouse to draw the rest of the Republicans out of the
building and shot them as they ran from the flames.225
After the firing ceased, the Democrats took the surviving Republicans
as prisoners and told them that the Democrats would treat them according
to the rules of war.226 Instead, several Democrats, led by William
Cruikshank, executed them.227 Only one, Levi Nelson, survived by
pretending to be dead until Cruikshank and his men left the scene.228 The
death toll at Colfax was three white men and more than 150 AfricanAmericans.229
The grisly slaughter at Colfax led to a federal indictment of 90 white
men under the section of the Enforcement Act of 1870 that made it a crime
to “band or conspire together” or “injure” or “intimidate” any person for
exercising a federal right—that is, a right protected by the “Constitution
or laws of the United States.”230 Most of the defendants were never found,
but nine were arrested and went to trial in 1874 in New Orleans.231 Along
with Levi Nelson’s testimony, James Beckwith, the white lawyer in the
case, used the body of African-American activist Alexander Tillman—
who had been found covered in stab wounds, his clothes ripped off, his
throat slashed, and his face beaten—as grounds for seeking the death
penalty.232 The wounds on his body, along with its position hundreds of

221. See LANE, supra note 214; KEITH, supra note 214.
222. See LANE, supra note 214; KEITH, supra note 214.
223. See LANE, supra note 214; KEITH, supra note 214.
224. See LANE, supra note 214; KEITH, supra note 214.
225. See LANE, supra note 214; KEITH, supra note 214.
226. See LANE, supra note 214; KEITH, supra note 214.
227. See LANE, supra note 214; KEITH, supra note 214.
228. See LANE, supra note 214; KEITH, supra note 214.
229. Joel M. Sipress, From the Barrel of a Gun: The Politics of Murder in
Grant Parish, 42 J. OF LA. HIST. ASS’N no. 3 303–21 (2001); BURTON, THE AGE
OF LINCOLN, supra note 12, at 303; see supra note 124.
230. See generally United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
231. LANE, supra note 214, at 124.
232. Id.
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feet from the courthouse, proved that the Democrats had slaughtered him
while fleeing.233
An all-white jury returned guilty verdicts for three men, including
Cruikshank.234 The defendants then moved to set the verdict aside,
claiming that the rights they were accused of invading were not “federal
rights” but state rights that Congress had no constitutional power to
protect235—precisely the type of argument the Supreme Court accepted in
the Slaughter-House Cases.
Circuit Judge William B. Woods and Supreme Court Justice Joseph
Bradley heard the motion. Because these were the two judges who had
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment broadly in Hall, everyone expected
that they would uphold this indictment and send Cruikshank and his codefendants to prison.236 Instead, Justice Bradley, in a mystifying change of
heart, agreed with the defendants that the indictment went beyond
Congress’s constitutional power.237 Judge Woods disagreed, maintaining
the view he had taken in Hall and voting to uphold the indictment and
conviction.238 Because the two judges disagreed, the case automatically
went to the Supreme Court.239
The eight counts of the indictment charged that on April 13, 1873, in
Grant Parish, Louisiana, Cruikshank and the others had “banded and
conspired together” to injure Levi Nelson and Alexander Tillman.240 That
alone would not have been a federal crime, since ordinary injury or
intimidation is a state crime. The key element needed in order to make the
conspiracy a federal crime was a showing that the purpose of the
conspiracy was tied specifically to a federal right or privilege.
Cruikshank seemed to provide the justices with a golden opportunity.
They had sharply limited the federal privileges that the Fourteenth
Amendment protected in the Slaughter-House Cases, but in doing so, the
Justices made the point that the case had nothing to do with race.241 Before
the justices now was a case that seemed designed to allow them to use the
Fourteenth Amendment to do something about the “onerous disabilities”

233.
234.
1874).
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
See generally United States v. Cruikshank, 35 F. Cas. 707 (C.C.D. La.
See generally Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.
See generally United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79 (1871).
Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707.
Judge Woods’s opinion was not reported.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.
See generally Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707.
See generally Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.

228

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

imposed on the “colored race.” Instead, the Slaughter-House chickens
came home to roost.
The decision of the Court was unanimous, including all four justices
who had dissented in Slaughter-House.242 The only newcomer, in fact, was
Chief Justice Morrison Waite, a man of slender talents who had been
President Grant’s fifth choice in a nearly year-long search after the death
of the former chief justice.243 Waite himself wrote the opinion, which
began with an emphatic description of the separateness of state and
national governments, the breadth of state powers, and the dearth of
national powers. Against that background, the opinion proceeded to go
through each of the eight separate counts of the indictment, methodically
rejecting any notion that the national government had any significant
power to protect Americans, and African-Americans in particular, closing
any doors that the Slaughter-House Cases might have left open.
One count charged that a purpose of the conspiracy was to interfere
with the victims’ right to peaceably assemble, which the Slaughter-House
opinion had listed as one of the few national privileges within the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection; but now, the Court took that back.
The Court ruled that peaceable assembly in general was a state privilege;
the only national privilege was peaceable assembly for the purpose of
petitioning the national Congress.244 If the indictment had specified that
“the object of the defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose,”
the Court said, the indictment would have been valid.245
It seems like a simple drafting problem, easily cured, but in fact the
Court assigned the prosecution an all but hopeless task. Specifics in an
indictment must be proven by evidence at trial, and thus, the Court’s rule
would have required proof that the white mob had in mind the specific fear
that the black gathering might have complained to the federal government,
and that they wished to keep them from reporting or complaining to the
federal government. Mere proof of racial hostility, or proof of a simple
desire to break up a black meeting or harass African-Americans, would
not have been enough for a conviction under the Supreme Court’s ruling.
Another count of the indictment alleged that the conspiracy was for
the purpose of interfering with the African-American victims’ rights to
equal treatment with white persons.246 The Supreme Court objected that
242. Id. at 542.
243. PAUL KENS & HEBERT A JOHNSON, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER
MORRISON R. WAITE, 1874–1888 (Univ. of S.C. Press, 2012); MORRISON R.
WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER (C. Peter Magrath ed., 1963).
244. See generally Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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“there is no allegation that this was done because of the race or color of
the persons conspired against,”247—this is utter nonsense. Certainly, a
charge that a conspiracy had a purpose of denying African-Americans the
same rights as white people is a charge that the conspiracy was done
because of race. The opinion went through the entire indictment in this
fashion, count-by-count, ticking off the reasons why each count was
beyond the power of Congress and ending with a resounding victory for
the murderers.248
Sadly, the history of 19th century white terrorism continues to burden
21st-century Louisiana. A plaque adorning the courthouse square in
downtown Colfax today still reads, “ON THIS SITE OCCURRED THE
COLFAX RIOT IN WHICH THREE WHITE MEN AND 150 NEGROES
WERE SLAIN THIS EVENT ON APRIL 13 1873 MARKED THE END
OF CARPETBAG MISRULE IN THE SOUTH.”249
VI. UNITED STATES V. REESE
On the same day the Supreme Court decided Cruikshank, it did even
more radical surgery on the Enforcement Act of 1870 in United States v.
Reese.250 Whereas Cruikshank had severely weakened one section of the
statute, Reese held that two other sections were unconstitutional and thus
completely void.
Part of the Enforcement Act was aimed at the various schemes
Southern election officials used to disqualify African-Americans from
voting.251 For example, registration officials often refused to accept an
African-American’s poll tax payment, and on Election Day, other officials
would turn the victim away from the polls for lack of a poll tax receipt.252
The Act defined two separate crimes: refusing to accept a poll tax payment
on account of race and refusing to accept, as a substitute for a poll tax
receipt, an affidavit describing the circumstances of such a refusal.253
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. White citizens erected the plaque in 1950 in opposition to the Civil Rights
Movement. See Bill Decker, Colfax riot or massacre, ADVOCATE (Mar. 7, 2013,
9:32 AM), https://www.theadvocate.com/nation_world/article_6ba52506-ed405fa3-a55b-c2ddb54e01f9.html [https://perma.cc/UMA5-XLUL].
250. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
251. See generally id.
252. See generally id.
253. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by Enforcement Act of
1870, ch. 114, § 8, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
1981–82 (2012)).
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This disenfranchisement scheme came before the Supreme Court in
1876 in United States v. Reese.254 The defendants, two Kentucky state
election officials, claimed that the statute was unconstitutional.255 The
Court’s opinion, again written by Chief Justice Waite, began by agreeing
that a law punishing election officials for rejecting votes on account of
race was “appropriate” legislation to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.256
That statement, however, was the only part of the majority opinion
that made any sense. In an 8–1 vote, the Court held that Sections 3 and 4
of the Enforcement Act were not limited to race and were therefore
unconstitutional.257 Although Section 2 did say that the registration
official’s refusal to accept the poll tax on account of race was illegal,
Sections 3 and 4, instead of repeating the phrase “on account of race,”
referred to that discriminatory act as “the wrongful act or omission
aforesaid of the person or officer charged with the duty of receiving or
permitting such performance or offer to perform.”258 It was perfectly
obvious that the words “as aforesaid” referred back to the immediately
preceding section’s words “on account of race.”259 The word “aforesaid”
had been used in exactly this way in various federal statutes over a
thousand times and had also been used by the Supreme Court Justices
themselves, without confusion, in nearly 50 other cases that same year—
seven of them written by Chief Justice Waite.260 Nevertheless, in this one
statute, the Court decreed that “aforesaid” did not mean “aforesaid,” and,
therefore, the Court pretended it was not clear that Congress had meant
race.261
The Court’s ruling on the meaning of Sections 3 and 4 was dishonest
and shameful. Justice Ward Hunt, in one of his rare dissenting opinions,
said as much, writing: “What do the words ‘as aforesaid’ mean?”262 Unless
they referred to racial discrimination, he continued, “they are wholly and
absolutely without meaning.”263 Chief Justice Waite, who, before and after
Reese, wrote many opinions confirming the universal understanding of
“aforesaid,” did not answer him.
254. Reese, 92 U.S. 214.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 228.
259. See generally id. at 231.
260. On this point, United States v. Reese has been overruled by the Supreme
Court, unanimously and by name.
261. Reese, 92 U.S. 214.
262. Id. at 222–38 (Clifford, J., dissenting); id. at 238–56 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 242 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
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By the end of the day on March 27, 1876, through both Cruikshank
and Reese, the Supreme Court had dismantled the central law protecting
African-Americans against both public and private lawlessness,
corruption, and mob violence. Whites, in turn, learned a valuable lesson:
they could murder African-Americans, overthrow legitimately elected
governments, and use fraud and terrorism to impose brutal white
supremacy across the entire South.
It was a combination of the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the
Reconstruction Amendments and a terroristic campaign that ended the
experiment in interracial democracy in the ex-Confederate states. Former
Confederates, working according to what came to be known as the
Mississippi Plan, had already violently overthrown the Republican
Mississippi state government in 1875.264 After Cruikshank, the same thing
happened in South Carolina, where Democrats followed a 33-point
manifesto written by former Confederate General Martin Gary, who said:
There are certain men . . . you must kill. Go in masses, armed, and
try to force the Negroes to vote our ticket. . . . Shoot them down
and cut off their ears, and I warrant you this will teach them a
lesson. If we are not elected we will . . . surround the statehouse,
and tear it down, and show them we will rule.265
Armed bands of horsemen, attired in symbolically defiant red shirts,
slaughtered African-American voters and their white allies, seized control
of the state government, and put the reins of power in the hands of the
former Commanding Officer of Gary, Confederate General Wade
Hampton.266
Before long, Democrats were largely in control of the former
Confederate states once more. When the presidential election of 1876 was
contested, the Democrats and Republicans worked out a deal whereby
Republican Rutherford B. Hayes would become President and
immediately withdraw the few federal troops that remained in the South.
He did so, and any hope of enforcing the law for African-Americans
disappeared along with the soldiers.267
264. See generally The Mississippi Plan, political deviance!, AAREG,
https://aaregistry.org/story/the-mississippi-plan-political-deviance/ [https://perma.c
c/UJ8P-7E8R] (last visited Oct. 1, 2018).
265. S. C. Democratic Candidate Martin W. Gary's “Plan of the Campaign of
1876”, in FRANCES BUTLER SIMKINS & ROBERT H. WOODY, SOUTH CAROLINA
DURING RECONSTRUCTION, app. 564–569 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1932).
266. BURTON, THE AGE OF LINCOLN supra note 12, at 307–08.
267. C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF
1877 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION (Little, Brown 1st ed. 1951); ORVILLE
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VII. ALL-WHITE JURIES
Violent interference with elections was not the only civil rights issue
with which the Court dealt during this period. Four years after Cruikshank
and Reese, the Supreme Court addressed the Fourteenth Amendment ban
on jury discrimination in two cases decided on the same day.268 One came
from West Virginia, where African-American Taylor Strauder was
charged with murder.269 The jury that tried and convicted him was, by the
specific terms of a West Virginia law, all white.270
On appeal, the Supreme Court emphatically declared that under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the rights of the races must be “exactly the same,”
and “the law in the states shall be the same for the black as for the
white.”271 The Court held that West Virginia’s statute was unconstitutional
and reversed Strauder’s conviction.272 This unambiguous decision seemed
to indicate that all-white juries were a thing of the past.
The Court had an opportunity to reinforce its ruling of Strauder in
Virginia v. Rives.273 When police charged Burwell and Lee Reynolds,
teenaged African-American brothers, with murdering a white man in
VERNON BURTON & DAVID HERR, Defining Reconstruction, in THE BLACKWELL
COMPANION TO THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 299–322 (Lacy Ford ed.,
2005); Michael Les Benedict, Reform Republicans and the Retreat from
Reconstruction, in THE FACTS OF RECONSTRUCTION 53–78 (Eric Anderson &
Alfred A. Moss, Jr. eds., 1991).
268. See Stauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100
U.S. 313 (1879).
269. See Stauder, 100 U.S. 303.
270. CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, JURY DISCRIMINATION: THE SUPREME COURT,
PUBLIC OPINION, AND A GRASSROOTS FIGHT FOR RACIAL EQUALITY IN
MISSISSIPPI 168 (2010). The law was passed in 1873 and remained in effect until
1875. Id. at 164, 168–69; Indictment, July 8, 1873, Record, State of West Virginia
v. Taylor Strauder, folder 18, Box 24.
271. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307.
272. Sadly, Justices Clifford and Field, the two Democrats, dissented and
argued that the explicit discrimination in the West Virginia law was perfectly
valid. Their view, never joined by any other Justice after the end of slavery, was
that African-Americans were entitled to virtually no rights, so a law keeping them
from an important position like a juror was not a denial of equal protection of the
laws. Justice Field’s record-breaking 34-year tenure was a long, dogged effort,
ultimately very successful, to make the Supreme Court the prime protector of
laissez–faire capitalism. He led the Court in twisting the Fourteenth Amendment
into a weapon against state regulation of business while denying AfricanAmericans any rights from the Amendment that the Slaughter-House Cases said
was adopted for their benefit. WALDREP, supra note 270, at 151.
273. Rives, 100 U.S. 313.
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Patrick County, Virginia,274 an all-white jury convicted Lee.275 His
attorneys turned to a federal judge, Alexander Rives, to overturn the
conviction.
Although Rives was from a slave-holding family in Virginia, he had
supported the Union, and African-Americans sat on his juries.276 He noted
that although the state law in Virginia did not call for all-white juries, no
African-American had ever been called for jury duty in the history of the
county.277 This disparity, Judge Rives found, could not “be imputed to
chance.”278 Not only did Judge Rives overrule the white jury’s conviction,
but he ordered the trial judge to be arrested.279 The case went to the
Supreme Court, which issued its ruling on the same day it struck down
Strauder’s conviction.
Though both cases involved African-Americans convicted by allwhite juries, Rives was unique. In West Virginia, the law explicitly
restricted jury service to “all white male persons.”280 The Virginia law did
not mention race; instead, African-Americans had been kept off the juries
by simple fraud.281
For the Supreme Court, unfortunately, this made all the difference.
The justices did not disagree with the facts but simply found that the
unbroken history of all-white grand juries and trial juries in Patrick County
was not proof of discrimination. According to the Court, the complete
absence of African-Americans from Reynolds’ jury—and from the entire
history of Patrick County juries—fell “short of showing that any civil right
was denied, or that there had been any discrimination against the
defendants because of their color or race.”282 In other words, the Court
274. Lee, age 19, and his brother Burwell, age 17, were both indicted.
Burwell’s case resulted in a hung jury, whereas Lee was convicted; thus, only
Burwell appealed his case and went to the Supreme Court.
275. See generally Ex parte Reynolds, 20 F. Cas. 586 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1878).
276. WALDREP, supra note 270, at 172–73.
277. Ex parte Reynolds, 20 F. Cas. at 291.
278. See generally id.
279. Although all-white juries were a universal practice in the South, those
who permitted them were committing a crime under the Civil Rights Act of 1875.
WALDREP, supra note 270, at 176.
280. See Stauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
281. See Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
282. Id. at 322. The Court gave little or no reason as to why it should apply the
removal provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 differently with regard to allwhite juries resulting from a state statute and all-white juries resulting from
unvarying state practice. See Anthony Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions
Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil rights: Federal removal and Habeas
Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793 (1965).
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found that “the jury which indicted them, and the panel summoned to try
them, [might] have been impartially selected.”283
Such a statement is flatly contradicted by elementary laws of
probability, known even then by schoolchildren. Nevertheless, it removed
the most important, and almost the only type of, evidence that could prove
African-Americans were being systematically excluded from juries. It was
now virtually impossible to show jury discrimination. These two cases,
taken together, gave the former Confederate states a clear blueprint for
what would become known as Jim Crow. As long as the laws did not
explicitly mention race, the former Confederate states could do whatever
they wanted.
VIII. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
In the early 1880s, after the justices had cut the heart out of the
Reconstruction Amendments, they used a pair of cases to cement an
extraordinarily effective barrier to African-American civil rights: the State
Action Doctrine.
In 1876, a gang of men seized four African-American prisoners in the
Crockett County, Tennessee jail.284 The gang lynched one man and beat
the others, and 20 members of the mob were indicted for conspiracy under
the Ku Klux Klan Act.285 They defended themselves with the argument
that had failed in Hall but succeeded in Cruikshank—as individuals, they
were immune to prosecution under federal civil rights law.286 In deciding
United States v. Harris, the Court unanimously agreed that the Fourteenth
Amendment imposed obligations only on the states; that is, it dealt only
with state action, not with the private action of individuals.287 The
Fourteenth Amendment obligates the states to protect citizens’ rights. In
Hall, Judge Woods, with Justice Bradley’s supporting correspondence,
reached the reasonable conclusion that the federal government can
prosecute individuals who, as individuals, are preventing states from
meeting their obligations to protect the rights of all citizens, including
African-Americans.288
The Supreme Court instead announced a blanket rule that under the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress could regulate state action but had no

283.
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power to punish private citizens.289 This decision came in spite of the
Congressional hearings on which the Ku Klux Klan Act was based, which
showed in bloody detail that if the federal government could not punish
private citizens, the Fourteenth Amendment was unenforceable. This
“State Action Doctrine” filled in the Jim Crow blueprint created by Rives.
States could already do whatever they wanted as long as they did not
mention race—now, private citizens could do whatever they wanted even
if they did mention race.
The cruel twist is that the unanimous opinion in Harris was written by
William B. Woods, the man who, as a lower court judge, had recognized
the protective power of the Fourteenth Amendment in the early case of
Hall.290 Woods stuck by that vision in Cruikshank, and was now sitting on
the Supreme Court. Whether Woods had changed his position on AfricanAmerican civil rights since Cruikshank or was simply relying on what was
now precedent in spite of his view, the result was the same.
IX. THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
Later that year, 1883, a group of cases came to the Supreme Court that
tested the last civil rights law of Reconstruction, the Civil Rights Act of
1875.291 The law banned racial discrimination in public accommodations:
“inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of
public amusement.”292 As a measure of the growing presence of AfricanAmericans in “society,” the places charged with excluding AfricanAmericans in these cases included the Grand Opera House in New York,
the dress circle of Maguire’s Theater in San Francisco, and the first-class
car of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad.293 The cases ultimately arrived
at the Supreme Court, which the Court decided under the group name The
Civil Rights Cases.294
Each defendant argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was
unconstitutional because Congress had no constitutional power to regulate
his private conduct.295 Supporters of the law argued that both the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments gave such power to Congress.
Justice Joseph Bradley, writing for an 8–1 majority, invoked the State
Action Doctrine saying that Congress had no power under the Fourteenth
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
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Amendment to keep private theater and hotel owners from
discriminating.296 He elaborated by distinguishing private wrongs from
state-imposed injury: “[a]n individual cannot deprive a man of his right to
vote . . . [H]e may, by force or fraud, interfere with enjoyment of the right,”
but “unless protected in these wrongful acts by some shield of state law or
state authority, he cannot destroy or injure the right.”297 The wrongdoer,
Bradley announced, can only subject himself to punishment under the law
of the state and not to federal punishment.298
Justice Bradley did agree that the Thirteenth Amendment was not
limited to state action and that Congress was empowered to legislate
against the “badges and incidents” of slavery. He said, however, that to
call something so trivial as white-only public accommodations badges of
slavery “would be running the slavery argument into the ground.”299
Justice Bradley concluded his argument:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants
of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his
elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to
be the special favorite of the law.300
This infamous remark missed the point entirely: African-Americans were
not seeking to be favorited by the law; they were seeking to be treated
equally under the law.
Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented.301 Over the coming years,
Justice Harlan, a former slave-owner, Confederate officer, and
fundamentalist Christian, would write enough important minority opinions
to earn the title “the Great Dissenter.” Harlan directly attacked the majority
opinion: “The substance and spirit of the recent amendments of the
Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal
criticism.”302 He said the universal law, recognized for hundreds of years
in England and the United States, required innkeepers and similar places
of public accommodation to serve all orderly patrons.303 The states’ refusal
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to enforce these age-old laws on behalf of African-Americans was state
action against which Congress surely had a right to legislate.
Harlan pointed out that the Supreme Court had repeatedly upheld
Congress’s power to protect slave-owners with exactly the type of
legislation it was now saying could not protect the former slaves.304
Although the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution had created a duty
only on the states, the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850 imposed both
civil and criminal penalties upon private citizens who interfered with the
state’s duty to return slaves or assisted fleeing slaves—for example, by
punishing private citizens who did so much as give a fugitive slave a glass
of water.305 The Supreme Court had upheld punishment of private citizens
under those laws repeatedly. The majority opinion, Harlan wrote, reduced
the Civil War Amendments, including the Fourteenth, to nothing more
than “‘splendid baubles,’ thrown out to delude those who deserved fair and
generous treatment at the hands of the nation.”306
With the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court completed its surgery
on the Reconstruction Amendments and Congress’s enforcement laws.
African-Americans entered the 1890s with no meaningful way to protect
their rights.
CONCLUSION
What accounted for the Supreme Court’s behavior in this period?
Commentators do not really know, but there are several possible factors
that contributed.
Some justices, according to a widely held view, simply followed the
national mood of white people that were tired of Reconstruction. Some
justices were inherently racist. Some adhered to an arid logic, commonly
called formalism, that could express shining principles—like the right to
fairly selected juries—while easily accepting procedures that destroyed
the right.
More fundamentally, many of the justices were unwilling to accept a
Constitution that had been turned inside out. Having spent their lifetime
under a state-oriented Constitution that reflected a fear of national power,
they were unprepared to see the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of vast
power for the national government. Justice Miller wrote in the SlaughterHouse Cases that interpreting the wartime amendments too broadly
304. Id.
305. See generally Fugitive Slave Acts, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Fugitive-Slave-Acts [https://perma.cc/UUC2SVFV] (last visited Oct. 1, 2018).
306. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 48.
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“radically change[d] the whole theory of the relations of the State and
Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to the
people.”307
But even this position makes sense only in the broader context of a
national ideology that subordinated African-Americans to white people:
every justice, northern and southern, had grown up in a society in which
African-Americans mattered less than white people. Chief Justice Taney
is rightly condemned for putting his personal racism into the Constitution,
but his description of the low esteem in which white people held AfricanAmericans painted an accurate picture of his society. The Supreme Court
justices lived in a world in which African-Americans’ concerns simply
were not particularly important.
In fact, it is possible that asking why the Court did what it did in the
late 1870s and 1880s is the wrong question to ask. These decades were
business as usual for the Court. It was the burst of egalitarian activity in
the decade following the Civil War that was truly exceptional. The Court
merely returned to the norm that had prevailed since before the American
Revolution.
Perhaps the post-War goals were unrealistic. The task was
unprecedented in world history: to go from a bloody war that stripped nine
million masters of their dominion over four million slaves to a society in
which the two stood on equal footing. Too many misunderstood the
problem, thinking it was to make good citizens out of the freed AfricanAmericans. The problem was actually to make law-abiding citizens out of
the Confederate rebels.
The following decades would show the difficulty of the task.
Inadvertently, perhaps, but no less ironically, the Fourteenth Amendment
created to protect African-Americans would be interpreted over the years
to restrict African-American citizenship and rights. The Warren Court
would use the Fourteenth Amendment again in the mid-20th century to
ensure African-American rights and support the modern Civil Rights
307. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 78 (1872). Justice Miller in The Ku
Klux Cases seems to confirm this notion, as the Court unanimously did uphold
convictions of private citizens (a mob of Klansmen) under Section 6 of the
Enforcement Act of 1870. The Ku Klux Cases, 110 U.S. 651 (1884). What led the
Court to allow prosecution of private individuals in The Ku Klux Cases was that
the victims’ right being invaded was their right to vote in a federal election, which
the Constitution, in Article I, Sections 2 and 4, specifically grants and authorizes
Congress to enforce. The Court said that while private violations “are not within
the scope of [the Fourteenth] amendment, it is quite a different matter when
congress undertakes to protect the citizen in the exercise of rights conferred by
the Constitution of the United States.” Id. at 666.
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Movement, often called the Second Reconstruction. But since the Warren
Court and since the 1960s, courts have used the Fourteenth Amendment
to roll back gains by African-Americans.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission led to large political
donations by groups supporting legislation that injured the rights of black
citizens.308 In Graham v. Connor, originating from Charlotte, North
Carolina, the Supreme Court ruled in a manner that has been used recently
to protect law enforcement officers when they injure or even kill AfricanAmericans during arrests.309 In a 1996 Texas redistricting case, Bush v.
Vera, the Fourteenth Amendment was used to challenge and discourage
the creation of black majority districts that allowed African-Americans to
have the opportunity to elect candidates of their choice.310 Even today,
affirmative action is being challenged on the basis of the Fourteenth
Amendment.311
The history of the Fourteenth Amendment echoes Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr.’s challenge: “I refuse to accept the idea that the ‘isness’ of man’s
present nature makes him morally incapable of reaching up for the eternal
‘oughtness’ that forever confronts him.”312
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